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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
INTERNATIONAL AMUSEMENTS, dba, 
ADULT BOOK AND CINEMA STORE, 
STUART LEE, DAVID ANDREW PAULY, 
HERSEL RICHARDSON, JR., and 
KENNETH BLAIR CLEVELAND, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty and sentence 
of each defendant for distributing pornographic material. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Each appellant has been separately charged for. 
distributing pornographic material in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated, 76-10-1204, 1953, as amended. The case was 
tried to a jury which entered a verdict of guilty against 
each defendant. Each defendant was subsequently sentenced 
by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding. 
Case No. 
14535 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants respectfully request this Court to 
set aside the convictions on the grounds that the Court 
erred in its instructions to the jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants were convicted by a jury and sentenced 
by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist for having distributed 
pornographic material in violation of Utah Code Annotated/ 
Section 76-10-1204, 1953, as amended. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Judge 
gave the following instructions to the jury: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
Before you can convict the defendant 
HERSEL RICHARDSON, JR., of the offense 
charged you must find all the following 
elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
1. That on or about the 9th day of 
December, 1975, the defendant did sell 
State's Exhibit IP within Weber County, 
State of Utah. 
2. That the Exhibit is in fact 
illegal pornography. Illegal pornography 
is defined as material that contains the 
following elements: 
A. That the material is offensive 
under local contemporary commu-
nity standards, when taken as a 
whole, and it appeals to the 
prurient interest in sex. 
B. It is patently offensive in the 
description or depiction of 
nudity, sexual conduct, sexual 
excitement, sado-masochistic 
abuse, or excretion. 
C. Taken as a whole, it does not 
have serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value. 
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All reasonable doubt in favor of the 
publication should be resolved so as to 
promote freedom of speech and expression, 
then 
If you find both of the above elements 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it is 
your duty to convict the defendant; if 
you do not so find, it is your duty to 
acquit the defendant, HERSEL RICHARDSON, JR. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
Before you can find defendant STUART 
LEE guilty of any of the counts in question, 
you must find all the elements of that count 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
COUNT IV 
1. That on or about December 9, 1975, 
there was sold and displayed for sale 
State's Exhibit 4P within Weber County, 
State of Utah, by the defendant. 
2. That the Exhibit is in fact illegal 
pornography. Illegal pornography is defined 
as material that contains the following 
elements: 
A. That the material is offensive 
under local contemporary commu-
nity standards, when taken as a 
whole, and it appeals to the 
prurient interest in sex. 
B. It is patently offensive in the 
description of nudity, sexual 
conduct, sexual excitement, 
sado-masochistic abuse, or 
excretion. 
C. Taken as a whole, it does not 
have serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value. 
All reasonable doubt in favor of the 
publication should be resolved in its favor 
so as to promote freedom of speech and 
expression, then 
If you find both of the above elements 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your 
duty to convict the defendant; if you do not 
so find, it is your duty to acquit the 
defendant. Each count is to be considered 
separately as though it was an independent 
case. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
Before you can find the defendant KENNETH 
BLAIR CLEVELAND guilty of the offense charged 
as either to Count II or Count III, you must 
find the following elements proven beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
1. That on or about the 5th day of 
December, 1975, the defendant did sell 
State's Exhibit 2P within Weber County, 
State of Utah or as the count considered 
may be. 
A. That on or about the 5th day of 
December, 1975, the defendant 
did sell State's Exhibit 3P 
within Weber County, Stcite of 
Utah. 
2. That the exhibits in fact aire 
illegal pornography. Illegal pornography 
is defined as material that contains the 
following elements: 
A. That the material is offensive 
under local contemporary commu-
nity standards, when taken as a 
whole, and it appeals to the 
prurient interest in sex. 
B. It is patently offensive in the 
description of nudity, sexual 
conduct, sexual excitement, sado-
masochistic abuse, or excretion. 
C. Taken as a whole, it does not 
have serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value. 
Such must be true as to the books 
considered separately as to Counts II and III. 
All reasonable doubt in favor of the. 
publication should be resolved in its value 
so as to promote freedom of speech and 
expression, then 
If you find both of the above elements 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your 
duty to convict the defendant; if you do not 
so find, it is your duty to acquit the 
defendant. Each count is to be considered 
separately as though it was an independent 
case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
Before you can find DAVID ANDREW PAULY, 
-5-
defendant, guilty of any of the counts in 
question, you must find all the elements 
of that count proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Count I. 
1. That on or about December 9, 1975, 
there was sold and displayed for sale 
State1s Exhibit IP within Weber County, 
State of Utah; and that he was the manager 
of the corporation and knew or should have 
known that such a book was displayed for 
sale, and that persons were employed for 
the purpose of the sale. 
2. That the Exhibit is in fact 
illegal pornography. Illegal pornography 
is defined as material that contains the 
following elements: 
A. That the material is offensive 
under local contemporary commu-
nity standards, when taken as a 
whole, and it appeals to the 
prurient interest in sex. 
B. It is patently offensive in the 
description or depiction of 
nudity, sexual conduct, sexual 
excitement, sado-masochistic 
abuse, or excretion. 
C. Taken as a whole, it does not 
have serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value. 
Count II. 
The elements are the same as above except 
the alleged sale was on December 5, 1975, 
State's Exhibit 2P, is to be considered. 
Count III. 
The elements are the same as above except 
the alleged sale was on December 5, 1975, 
State's Exhibit 3P, is to be considered. 
Count IV. 
The elements are the same as above except 
the alleged sale was on December 9, 1975, 
State's Exhibit 4P. 
If you find any of the Counts proven, 
that is both elements thereon, it is your duty 
to convict of that count; if you do not so 
find, it is your duty to acquit of that count. 
Each count should be considered with the same 
dignity and diligence that you would consider 
if it were the only charge. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
Before you can find the defendant cor-
poration INTERNATIONAL AMUSEMENTS dba 
ADULT BOOK AND CINEMA STORE, guilty of 
the offense charged, you must find all of 
the following elements proven: 
Count I. 
1. That on or about December 9, 1975, 
there was sold and displayed for sale 
State's Exhibit IP within Weber County, 
State of Utah; and that the corporation's 
local managing authorities knew or should 
have known that such a book was displayed 
for sale, and that persons were employed 
for the purpose of the sale. 
2. That the Exhibits are in fact 
illegal pornography. Illegal pornography 
is defined as material that contains the 
following elements: 
A. That the material is offensive 
under local contemporary commu-
nity standards, when taken as a 
whole, and it appeals to the 
prurient interest in sex. 
B. It is patently offensive in the 
description or depiction of 
nudity, sexual conduct, sexual 
excitement, sado-masochistic 
abuse, or excretion. 
C. Taken as a whole, it does not 
have serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value. 
Such must be true as to the books considered 
separately as to the Count I. 
Count II. 
The elements are the same as above except 
the alleged sale was on December 5, 1975, 
State's Exhibit 2P, is to be considered. 
Count III. 
The elements are the same as above except 
the alleged sale was on December 5, 1975, 
State's Exhibit 3P, is to be considered. 
Count IV. 
The elements are the same as above except 
the alleged sale was on December 9, 1975, 
State's Exhibit 4P. 
If you find any of the above counts proven, 
that is both elements thereon, it is your duty 
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to convict of that count; if you do not 
so find, it is your duty to acquit of 
that count. Each count should be-
considered with the same dignity and 
diligence that you would consider if 
it were the only charge. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
Contemporary community standards means 
those current standards in the vicinage 
where an offense alleged under this action 
has occurred. 
Nudity means the showing of the human 
male or female genitals, pubic area, or 
buttocks> with less than an opaque 
covering, or; the showing of the female 
breast with less^ than an opaque covering, 
or any portion thereof below the top of 
the nipple, or the depiction of covered 
male genitals in a discernably turgid state. 
Sexual conduct means acts of masturba-
tion, sexual intercourse, or any touching 
of a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, 
pubic area, buttocks, or, if the person is 
a female, breast, whether alone or between 
members of the same or opposite sex or 
between humans and animals in an act of 
apparent or actual sexual stimulation or 
gratification. 
Sexual excitement means a condition 
of human male or female genitals when in 
a state of^sex^ual stimulation or arousal, 
or the sensual experiences of humans 
engaging in or witnessing sexual condtict 
or nudity. 
Sado-masochistic abuse means 
flagellation or torture by or upon a 
person who is nude or clad in undergarments, 
a mask, or in a revealing or bizarre costume, 
or the condition ofbeing fettered, bound or 
otherwise physically restrained on the 
part of one so clothed. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
The test is not whether it would arouse 
sexual desires or sexual impure thoughts in 
those comprising a particular segment of the 
community, the young, the immature or the 
highly prudish or would leave another segment, 
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the scientific or highly educated or the 
so-called worldly-wise and sophisticated 
indifferent and unmoved. 
The test in each case is the effect 
of the book, picture or publication 
considered as a whole, not upon any 
particular class, but upon all those 
whom it is likely to reach. In other 
words, you determine its impact upon the 
average person in the community. The 
books, pictures and circulars must be 
judged as a whole, in their entire context, 
and you are not to consider detached or 
separate portions in preaching a conclusion. 
You judge the circulars, pictures and 
publications which have been put in evidence 
by present-day standards of the community. 
You may ask yourselves does it offend the 
common conscience of the community by 
present-day standards. 
In this case, members of the juiry, you 
and you alone are the exclusive judges of 
what the common conscience of the community 
is, and in determining that conscience, you 
are to consider the community as a whole, 
young and old, educated and uneducated, the 
religious and the irreligious--men, women 
and children. 
Appellants submitted jury instructions to the Court 
which do not appear in the records filed with the Utah Supreme 
Court, but do appear as having been submitted on Page 166 
of the transcript of the trial. 
Furthermore, the appellants objected to the 
instructions as given on pages 171 through 173 of the transcript 
of the trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS NO. 4, 5 
6, 8 AND 9 IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
MANDATED AND STATUTORILY REQUIRED ELEMENT OF SCIENTER. 
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In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), the 
United States Supreme Court invalidated a California statute 
which made it unlawful for a bookseller to have obscene 
material in his possession, even though he had no knowledge 
of its content or character. In expressing the fear that 
the elimination of scienter would inhibit and curtail free 
expression, the Supreme Court declared: 
"By dispensing with any requirement, 
of knowledge of the contents of the book 
on the part of the seller, the ordinance 
tends to impose a severe limitation on 
the public's access to constitutionally 
protected matter. For if the bookseller 
is criminally liable without knowledge 
of the contents, and the ordinance 
fulfills its purpose, he will tend to 
restrict the books he sells to those he 
has inspected; and thus the State will 
have imposed a restriction upon the -
distribution of constitutionally 
protected as well as obscene literature. 
* * * And the bookseller's burden would 
become the public's burden, for by 
restricting him the public's access to 
reading matter would be restricted. If 
the contents of bookshops and periodical 
stands were restricted to material of 
which their proprietors had made an 
inspection, they might be depleted indeed. 
The bookseller's limitation in the amount 
of reading material with which he could 
familiarize himself, and his timidity in 
the face of his absolute criminal 
liability, thus, would tend to restrict 
the public's access to forms of the 
printed word which the State could not 
constitutionally suppress directly. The 
bookseller's self-censorship, compelled 
by the State, would be a censorship 
affecting the whole public, hardly less 
virulent for being privately administered. 
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Through it, the distribution of all 
books, both obscene and not obscene, 
would be impeded." -- 361 U.S. at 
153-154. 
In Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), the 
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a book publisher 
under a New York obscenity statute which ostensibly 
contained no scienter requirement. Although the statute 
appeared to impose strict liability, the Court noted that the 
New York Court of Appeals had interpreted the statute to 
require the vital element of scienter. The Court quoted the 
New York Court's interpretation which held that: 
A reading of the [New York] 
statute. . . as a whole clearly indi-
cates that only those who are in some 
manner aware of the character of the 
material they attempt to distribute 
should be punished. . . 383 U.S. at 
510. 
The Court concluded that this construction foreclosed a 
challenge to the statute based on Smith v. California, supra. 
Most recently, the Supreme Court in Hamling v. United 
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), declared: 
"We think the 'knowingly1 lan-
guage of 18 U.S.C. §1461, and the 
instructions given by the District 
Court in this case satisfied the 
constitutional requirements of 
scienter. It is constitutionally 
sufficient that the prosecution show 
that a Defendant had knowledge of the 
contents of the materials he 
distributes, and that he knew the 
character and nature of the materials." 
418 U.S. at 123. 
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In line with these pronouncements of the United 
States Supreme Court, numerous state courts have held that a 
Defendant cannot be-convicted ,of an obscenity offense unless 
the prosecution proves beyond a^r-easonable doubt that the 
Defendant had knowledge of the material's contents* State v. 
Locks, 97 Ariz.. 148, 397 P. 2d 949 (1964); State v. Oman, 
265 Minn.:H277; 121 N.Wi:2d 616 (1963); State v. Richardson, 
506 S.W. 2d 483 4Mo*App* 1974). Of course, such knowledge 
can be inferred by the jury based on the circumstances 
surrounding the distribution or sale., Parrish,-v. State, 
521 S.W. 2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); State v. American 
Theatre Corp., 193 Nebr. 289, 227 N.W. 2d 390 (1975). 
The Utah legislature has also recognized that 
knowledge of the material?}s contents is an essential element 
of distributing pornographic material. Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 76-10-1204, 1953, as amended, states: 
(1) A person is guilty of dis-
tributing pornographic material 
when he knowingly. . . . 
Theword "knowingly" is defined in Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 76-10-1201 (4), 1953, as amended, as: 
An awareness, whether actual or 
constructive of the character of 
material, or of a; performance. 
Yet, despite the opinions of the United States 
Supreme Court and the: declaration of the Utah Legislature 
that knowledge of the material's contents is an essential 
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element for conviction under §76-10-1204, Utah Code Annotated, 
the trial court failed to so instruct the jury. A glance at 
the jury instructions given with respect to the defendants 
Richardson, Lee and Cleveland demonstrates that the jury 
could have determined guilt without giving any consideration 
as to whether these defendants had any knowledge of the 
contents of the material. Jury instructions nos. 4, 5, and 
6 are identical: 
That on or about the 9th day of 
December, 1975, the defendant did 
sell state's exhibit. . . . 
No mental element precedes the word sell in the instructions. 
Liability appears to be strict. Nor was the statutory definition 
of 'knowingly1 given in instruction 14 where numerous other 
statutory definitions found in 76-10-1201, Utah Code Annotated^ 
are set out. 
The almost identical situation faced the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals in Keene v. Commonwealth, 516 S.W. 2d 852 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1974). In Keene, the trial court failed to 
instruct the jury that the defendant could be found guilty 
only if the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant had knowledge of the material's obscenity. In 
reversing, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated: 
Appellant asserts that prejudicial 
error was committed in the instructions 
given to the jury. We are forced to agree. 
KRS 436.101 provides in pertinent part: 
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"Any person who, having knowledge 
of the obscenity thereof. . . exhibits 
. . . any obscene matter is punishable." 
The trial judge failed to instruct on the 
required ^element of knowledge ,;„ which is 
an essential part of the statutorily 
created offense. The error was properly 
preserved for review. The instructions 
were otherwise acceptable against a 
claim of prejudicial error. For the 
omission of an element of the crime from 
the instruetions, the judgment must 
regretably be reversed for a new trials 
On a new trial the jury will be 
instructed aa our: statute plainly requires 
that they must believe that the defendant 
l!had knowledge of the obscenity of the 
film." 
See, also, Cohen v. State, 125 So. 2d 560 at 563 (Fla. 1960). 
Turning to jury instructions 8 and 9, which defined 
the elements of liability to convict the defendants Pauly and 
International Amusements, Inc., it is obvious that once again 
the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the essential 
element of knowledge as defined, in 76-10-1201 (4), Utah Code 
Annotated. While these instructions do require that Pauly 
(jury instruction no. 8), and the local managing^authority 
of International Amusements, Inc. (jury instruction no. 9), 
have knowledge or reason to know the materials were offered 
for sale, neither instruction requires any knowledge of the 
character or content of the material. 
The failure of the court to instruct the jury on both 
the constitutionally mandated and statutorily required element 
of the offense was prejudicial error and as such the defendants 
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are entitled to a new trial. See, Cohen v. State, supra; 
Keene v. Commonwealth, supra; State v. Hartley, 16 Utah 2d 123, 
396 P. 2d 749 (1964); 23 C.J.S. §1194. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY THAT THE. MATERIAL WAS TO BE JUDGED BY A STATEWIDE 
STANDARD. 
Jury instruction no. 14 states: 
Contemporary community standards means 
those current standards in the vicinage 
where an offense alleged under this 
action occured. 
Obscenity is to be judged by community standards. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); State v. Phillips, 
540 P. 2d 936 (1975); §76-10-1204, Utah Code Annotated. But, 
the Supreme Court in Miller or in any subsequent decision 
dealing with obscenity has not defined the exact "meets and 
bounds" of the community. This task was left up to the 
individual state courts and legislatures. Jenkins v. Georgia, 
418 U.S. 153 (1974). The clear majority of state high courts 
considering the issue have held that a material's obscenity must 
be judged by a statewide community standard. Court v. State, 
6^3 Wis. 2d 570, 217 N.W. 2d 676 (1974); State v. J-R Distributor; 
Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P. 2d 1049 (1973); People v. Heller, 
352 N.Y.S. 2d 601, 307 N.E. 2d 805 (1973); Pierce v. State, 
292 Ala. 472, 296 So. 2d 218 (1974); People v. Tabron, 544 P. 2d 
380 (1976); People v. Thomas, 346 N.E. 2d 190 (111. Ct. App. 197 
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The logic behind employing a statewide community 
standard was clearly spelled out by the Alabama Supreme Court 
in Pierce v. State/ supra• 
Alabama would be faced with many 
problems in determining the exact 
scope of the community if it were 
smaller than the state as a whole. 
On first impulse, one would think that 
the county would be an appropriate 
geographical unit for establishing 
standards because one assumes a 
natural relationship between the 
county and the jury vicinage. However, 
this assumption is not always accurate, 
for in Alabama, there are a number of 
counties that have judicial divisions 
separating geographical areas in a 
county with separate courthouses for 
each such area. Prospective jurors 
that are assembled for trial selection 
in such counties come from within the 
bounds of such geographical divisions 
and cannot be representative of the 
entire county. Such judicial geographi-
cal divisions (which are even applicable 
to the circuit courts) within such 
counties present problems pertaining 
to localized standards on a countywide 
basis. 
Assuming for the sake of argument 
that standards will vary from county to 
county, then arguably, the standards 
may also vary from city to city. 
Moreover, taking the assumption one 
step further, there may be within a 
given city different standards, say 
in residential neighborhoods as opposed 
to the areas surrounding a college 
campus and, perhaps, a trial court 
judge would have to deal with a number 
of standards. This myriad of possibili-
ties for standards, coupled with the 
temporal requirement that standards be 
"contemporary" clearly demonstrates the 
burden which would be placed on the 
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judicial system in drying to determine 
which standards are applicable at 
which location at which time. 
Furthermore, if « » « t l » 
construed to be an « e > f ^ 1 1 " ^ s 
the state, then the problem arises as 
to wnethlr standards must be proven by 
extrinsic or « P « * ' " S f f t ; ^ or 
S E f t u ^ " ; " ^ T t S ^ n a t i o n 
- ^ i l V e m e / r o ^ t h f e f b o d ^ n t " 
of ' the community. then proof of standards 
for the toy's sake would be superfluous. 
If a judge without a jury is allowed to 
t,vl i-hp same determination under the 
stme concept then there would be no need 
°
T
 " °
f
 ipellftflourfbeTnformfd as 
rwhI"ltrdardf:eS applied below, 
under this alternative method an appellate 
cSurt could make no independent * f ^ i n a " 
tiSn of the issue of obscenity vel non. 
The results under such a system would 
cause many disparities in criminal 
cSnvfcuSns. While under our system of 
federalism it is fundamental and 
^slrable for the national government 
" ^rndfrL'^ere^is'nrunLflying. 
rns?iatudt?onai or policy basis mandating 
deference to "local communities and to 
= do so most certainly would lead to abuse 
of criminal process. 296 So. 2d at 224. 
A state obscenity statute must employ a statewide community 
standard, 
The leaislature has provided us 
with a delation of community standards 
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penalties for the violation of a 
state obscenity statute without 
knowing what the standard is that 
will determine his guilt or 
innocence. The random decision of 
a judge or jury cannot be the 
standard, and the state statute 
should not be construed in a 
different manner in Denver, 
Littleton, Grand Junction, 
Colorado Springs, and Aspen. 
People v. Tabron, 544 P. 2d at 381 
(197.6..U 
In the present case, a look at jury instruction no. 14 
indicates that the jury was given no guidance and clarity as to 
the relevant community. Thus, it would have conceivable 
determined the defendants1 guilt by considering the impact of 
the materials on a community more limited than the state of Utah. 
More than likely, the material was judged by its effect on 
citizens of Ogden. But, what would have been tolerated in-
Salt Lake City might have been deemed shocking in Ogden. The 
failure of a trial court to instruct the jury on a statewide 
community standard has been held to be reversible error by 
numerous courts. Dumas v. State, 131 Ga. 79, 205 S.E. 2d 119 
(Ga. App. 1974); People v, Andrek, 375 N.Y.S.. 2d 40 (N.Y. Supreme 
Ct. 1975). The defendants would urge this Honorable Court to 
follow the logic of these courts and reverse the convictions, 
since jury instruction: no•.,.-..•1-4 was an unclear and erroneous 
statement of the law. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
THAT IN EVALUATING THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COMMUNITY, THEY COULD 
CONSIDER CHILDREN AS PART OF THAT COMMUNITY. 
-18-
Jury instruction no. 15 states in part: 
In this case, members of the jury, you 
and you alone are the exclusive judges 
of what the common conscience of the 
community is, and in determining that 
conscience you are to consider the 
community as a whole, young and old, 
educated and uneducated, the religious 
and the irreligious--men, women and 
children. 
A state is free to adopt more stringent controls on 
communicative materials available to youths than adults. 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Erzoznick v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). Thus, as to some materials, 
sales to adults may be a constitutionally protected activity, 
while sales of the same material to minors may be barred and 
punished. State v. Siegel, 354 A. 2d 103 (N.J. Super. 1976). 
Material which is protected for 
distribution to adults is not 
necessarily constitutionally protected 
from restriction upon its dissemination 
to children. In other words, the 
concept of obscenity or of unprotected 
matter may vary according to the group 
to whom the questionable material is 
directed or from whom it is quarantined. 
Because of a State's exigent interest 
in preventing distribution to children 
of objectionable material, it can 
exercise its power to protect the 
health, safety, welfare and morals 
of its community by barring the 
distribution to children of books 
recognized to be suitable for adults. 
Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 636. 
Were the materials in the present case sold or made 
available to children, there is no doubt that the jury could ha\ 
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considered the impact of the material on juveniles. But, from 
the record, it is crystal clear that not a scintilla of evidence 
was ever presented to show sale or availability of the material 
to minors. Indeed, the defendants were never charged with 
distribution of obscene materials to minors. It takes little 
common sense to realize that material which may be "highly 
prurient" to children will in some cases not even phase an adult. 
Yet, under^ jury instruction no. 15, the :jury was pemitted to 
judge the material as to its possible effect.on children. 
While the United States Supreme Court has recognized 
that certain special obscenity instructions may be given with 
r&gar:d* to standards^, there-: must be evidence to support such 
instructions. In Mishkin v. New York, supra, the,Court held 
that where evidence established that books were..marketed for 
a clearly defined deviant groups%he prurience of the material 
could be measured by the effect on members of that group. In 
Ginzberg v. United States, -383 U.S. 463 1X966) , evidence of 
pandering was admissible to establish the element of prurience. 
Unlike the above two cases, there was no evidence 
before the court to justify an instruction whichallowed the 
jury to speculate as to the materials effect on children. 
Indeed this portion of the jury instruction was contrary to 
§76-10-1203 (2), Utah Code Annotated, which states: 
In any prosecution dealing with 
an offense relating to pornographic 
material or performance, or dealing 
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in harmful material, the question 
whether material or a performance 
appeals to prurient interest in sex 
shall be determined with reference 
to average adults or average minors 
as the case may be. 
The statute makes it clear that where sales are alleged to be 
solely to adults, the relevant community in determining pruriency 
is an adult one. 
As given, jury instruction no. 15 was not supported by 
the evidence, contrary to the direction of §76-10-1203 (2), 
and prejudicial to the defendants. Its damaging effect requires 
that the defendants be granted a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants1 convictions should be reversed and 
a new-trial granted i;Q-each of them for the Court's failure tot-
properly instruct the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants 
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